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. INTRODUCTION
••• nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.

-- Takings Clause of the 5th Amendment of the US Constitution

Until recently, Congress had been content to let the
judiciary draw the line on takings by deciding when the
government must pay compensation to private property owners.
However, some members of the US Congress have proposed new
legislation which would significantly change the current federal
approach to regulatory takings. (1) These legislative proposals
are seeking to replace much of the case law interpreting the
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.

Despite judicial decisions

favoring private property owners in the last few years, many in
Congress believe that a clear standard on regulatory takings is
needed, a standard which will better protect private property
rights in the face of government regulation by reducing the
amount of property value diminution required before the
government must compensate private property owners.

These

members believe expanded protection of property rights is
consistent with the intentions of the framers of the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause.

At the heart of the conflict is the

historical tension between individual rights and the interests
of the pUblic, or, as some would say, the will of the majority.
There are no easy answers to this timeless dilemma.
Recent case law and legislative proposals reflect a general
hostility toward government regulations, especially those
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designed to protect the environment and natural resources.
Opponents of the proposals are concerned that these court
decisions and pieces of legislation would, if enacted, create a
cost deterrent to needed regulations. (2)
Proponents argue that needed regulations would still be
enforced, but would no longer be "on the backs of particular
individuals."

The government should bear the costs when society

as a whole benefits from the use of private land. (3)

Proponents

also argue that the costs would not be prohibitive if government
agencies act efficiently. (4)

By inference, acting efficiently

would mean foregoing regulations necessary for the protection of
public welfare and safety.

The only other option under these

pieces of legislation and case law would be to compensate
landowners, because the proposals make compensation mandatory for
regulations which affect property values even minimally.
However, both the House and Senate proposals found it unnecessary
to allocate additional funds for landowner compensation required
by the proposals.
existing budget.

Instead, the money must come from an agency's
This forces government agencies to decide

between bearing the expense of certain regulations or foregoing
their promulgation altogether.
The view that government regulation is overburdensome, and
interferes with the landowner's ability to prosper is a familiar
theme.

This them to some extent finds its roots in the

libertarian ideology which advocates the limited role of
government.

In turn, the roots of the libertarian ideology may

3

be found to some extent in the classical philosophy of property
espoused by John Locke in the late 17th century. (5)

Locke

contended that property rights existed before government and
therefore government's role is limited to that of protector of
preexisting individual rights which are inherent in man.

Many

people believe that the libertarian ideology as stated by Locke
was the inspiration behind the Fifth Amendment, but there are
still many arguments to contrary.

For example, it can be stated

that Locke's ideas are overly broad and ineffective solution to a
problem which requires a balancing of the public interest with
the protection of private property rights.
The justifications of this new wave of legislation, case
law, and the underlying ideas about property rights have been
hotly debated both politically and academically.

The underlying

clash of ideas will no doubt continue as it has for over two
centuries.

Supporters of property rights view the issue of

"takings" through the perspective of classical property theory.
This perspective ignores the historical case law and even departs
from from current case law such as Lucas v. South Carolina

Coastal Council (6).

Ultimately, these ideas fail to acknowledge

that a balance of interest is necessary.

Property rights

propnents claim that protection of private property rights must
be restored in order to carry out the intentions behind the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause.
early case law.

This contention finds no basis in the

A review of the history and development of the

Fifth Amendment Takings Clause through legislation and
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case law can present more balanced alternatives to the types of
legislation being presently proposed.

We will begin by

discussing current issues and then move through the history of
this controversial piece of the Constitution in order to find the
roots of today's debate.
RECENT LEGISLATIVE ISSUES

The property rights protection bill that passed in the 104th
House in 1995 is H.R. 925 or the "Private Property Protection Act
of 1995."

House of Representatives 925 falls under the category

of "compensation" bills as opposed to the "assessment" bills.
Compensation bills focus on paying the landowner for diminution
in the value of his or her land.

Assessment bills propose a

"taking impact analysis" by federal agencies before they
promulgate any regulation which might adversely impact the value
of private property.
House of Representatives 925 would affect all federal
agencies which promUlgate regulations under the authority of
those acts specified in the proposal.

The proposal requires

federal agencies to compensate anyu landowner whose land value
has been decreased by 20% or more by such regulation.

If the

diminution reaches 50% of the land value, the landowner can force
the agency to buy the land outright for "fair market value."
Additionally, the bill requires only the affected portion of the
property to be considered in measuring the affect of the federal
agency action, thus making it significantly easier to obtain
compensation.

Even if the landowner cannot meet the 20'% level
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of diminution for the entire piece of property, he may make a
compensation claim for a smaller portion.
Section 3(B) of this act prohibits indefinitely a restricted
use for which the agency has paid compensation, even if the
restriction is later withdrawn.

If the agency later rescinds the

restriction and the landowner wishes to pursue the previously
restricted use, he or she must repay the compensation with the
amount adjusted for inflation.

In ssence, the government is

buying from the landowner the particular land use being
prohibited by the agency action.
Despite the attempt to clarify this area of law, ambiguities
would arise if courts encounteres the nuisance exception proposed
in both bills.

Two types of nuisance exceptions exist; those

which defer to the existing state law and those which are defined
in the legislation themselves.
types.

The House proposal contains both

It requires the avoidance of inconsistency between state

law and the federal Act.

Under this provision, anything already

prohibited by state nuisance law or local zoning will not be
compensable.

Those courts whcih have traditionally been more

deferential to state legislatures in the area of land use law may
find a more expansive definition of public nuisance possible.
Thus, the bill will likely have a disparate affect on olandowners
according to thesitus of the property.

The second exception in

H.R. 925 seeks to avoid compensation for the federal prohibition
of those land uses which would cause a hazard to public health or
safety or damage to "specific property" other than the regulated
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property.

This may be a difficult distinction for courts to draw

given the interdependence of land and the broad effect land uses
are now know to have.
Additionally, proponents also attempted to pass a bill in
the Senate that would expand the protection of property rights
from its current judicial interpretation under the Fifth
Amendment.

The Senate version, S 605 was the second introduced

by former Senator Bob Dole.

Senate 605 or the "Omnibus Property·

Rights Act of 1995," is more comprehensive than H.R. 925

in that

it is not limited to compensation but also has an extensive
provision on agency assessment.

In addition, the Senate proposal

is not limited solely to the coverage of laws aimed at
environmental protection.

The proposal applies to all agency

regulations regardless of the law under which the regulation was
promulgated.

This proposal also applies to state agency

regulations required or funded by the federal government.

The

Senate version requires 33% or greater before a property owver
would be awarded compensation.
The proposal has five sections, the first of which is the
statement of findings and purpose.

The statement of findings in

the proposal reiterates the traditional libertarian position of
property rights advocates.

The findings state that "there is.a

need both to restrain the Federal Government in its overzealous
regulation of the private sector and to protect private property,
which is a fundamental right of the American people."
also states that the Supreme Court's current

The bill
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interpretation of the Fifth Amendment is "ineffective" and
"costly."

The bill attempts to "clarify the law" and "vindicate

property rights."
provision.
law.

Title II sets forth the compensation

Section 204 is somewhat an attempt to codify existing

This section provides for "just compensation" when private

property is taken or invaded or when the owner is "deprived of
all or substantially all economically beneficial or productive
use of the property.

This rule is similar to the one

articulated by the Supreme Court in Lucan v. South Carolina

Coastal Council.

However, the rule as stated in Lucas requires

that "all economically beneficial use" be prohibited by the
regulation before a taking may be found on this factor alone.
The rule state in S. 605 has modified the Lucas "total takings"
test to include the loss of "substantially all economically
beneficial use."

How much of a loss "substantially all" would

require is unclear from the proposals, but the rule appears to be
more in line with the "partial takings" rule articulated in

Florida Rock Ind., Inc. v. United States, which found a 95%
diminution in value substantial enough to constitute a taking
under the Fifth Amendment.

Section 204(D) provides for

compensation when the "fair market value of the affected portion
of the property" is diminished by 33% or more.
Senate 605 also establishes a nuisance exception equivalent
to that in Lucas.
to one exception.

The "total takings" test in Lucas is subject
If a landowner is denied all economically

beneficial use of his or her land, the prohibition
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must inherein the title itself, in the restrictions that
background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance
already place upon land ownership.

A law or decree with such an

effect must "do no more than duplicate the result that could have
been achieve in the courts, under the state's law of private
nuisance or by the State under its complementary power to abate
nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise."

Thus,

the government would have the burden of showing that the
regulation merely prevents a use which would be considered a
nuisance in accordance with state common law.

Whether this will

have a clarifying effect is doubtful given the uncertainty
inherent ub tge nuisance exception created by Lucas.
Authors of the Senate proposal also attempted to make it
easier for landowners to overcome procedural hurdles which may
provent court form deciding the merits of certain cases.

First,

they proposed an amendment to the Tucker Act which is seen as an
obstacle to landowners in seeking judicial relief.

Under the

Tucker Act, the landowner must choose whether he or she wishes to
challenge the law itself, either facially or as applied, in which
case the landowner must proceed to Federal District Court.
However, if the landowner wishes to pursue a compensation claim, .
he is to proceed in the Federal Court of Claims.

The proposal's

ameendment expands the jurisdication of the Federal Court of
Claims under the Tucker Act so that the landowner could bring
actions under the proposed legislation.

It would also allow the

Federal Court of Claims to "grant injunctive and declaratory

-_.....
.. '

~'-'---.

-_._~-

'.'-

.-

-.------------

.'-

,,~.,
~.;.~'.

9

relief when appropriate" and assert ancillary jurisdiction in
certian cases.

Additionally, under current law there are

requirements whcih the landowner must meet before the claim is
considered "ripe."

The ripeness doctrine for inverse

condemnation carses of action is sometimes difficult to overcome.
The landowner must show that the decision of the governmental
entity denying the landowner's request for the use of his or her
property is final and that compensation has been sought throught
any other channels provided by the land use entity as espoused in
Williamson County Reg. Planning Commission v. Hamilton.

By

creating an independent cause of action and conferring standing
on anyone "adversely affected by an agency action," reaching the
merits of a takings claim would prove much easier.

Of course,

this is only true if a federal agency action, or one mandated or
funded by the federal government, is at issue.

These proposals,

if enacted, would have a great impact on the federal agencies'
ability to effect land use management regulations.

Although H.R.

925 was adopted by the l04th House of Representatives, the l04th
Senate failed to pass any kind of property rights protection
legislation and it is speculative to presume that similar
proposals will be presented with any success in future sessions.
Whether or not further proposals are successful, the ideas which
these proposals have already brought to the forefront may not
fade as easily as the political tide which brought them. (7)

In

other words, the view of property rights represented by the
failed proposals survives.

Thus, any concerns which surround the
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proposals and the view of property rights and the Takings Clause
should not end with the adjournment of Congress.
LIBERTARIAN PERSPECTIVES

The libertarian view of property rights is represented by
the legislative proposals in more ways than one.

First, the

proposals adopt only those rules which reinforce a limited
government role in promulgating regulations which affect land
use.

The proposals make the finding of diminution particularly

easy for the land owner by setting a low percentage level of
diminution and by allowing the landowner to show that only a
portion of his property has been diminished.

These rules would

severely limit federal agencies from promUlgating regulations
which in any way affect" the monetary value of land.

By forcing

the federal agencies to pay for every diminution in property
value over 20% or 33%, these rules would have in effect forced
the end of regulation which has up to this point been
constitutionally permissable.

These regulations in many cases

may still be considered necessary to the public good.
Proponents contend that regulations causing a decrease in
private property values are either inefficient or overburdensome,
and must be paid for. (8)

This contention is premised on the

libertarian view of property rights:

the rights of the landowner

to do what what he see fit with his property as an inherent right
which should not be abridged by any government action, aside from
common law nuisance.

Any restriction on land use is viewed as an

imposition upon these God-given rights.
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Secondly, proponents have asserted that the proposals are n
line with the original intent of the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause because it is base on libertarian principles.

There are

several instances in the congressional record where supporters of
this proposed legislation have expressed that at least onel
reason to enact such legislation is that it is required by the
libertarian principles behing the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.
Representative Emerson indicated on the floor of the House that
"clearly the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is one of
the greatest liberties ever given in the free world.

However, in

recent years, private landowners have seen the Federal Government
and radical "preservationist" groups infringing on the private
property rights protected by the Fifth Amendment."
Representative Hayworth concurred saying, "in supporting this
legislation, we in Congress have the opportunity to reaffirm what
Locke referred to as the "root of all liberty" - the right ot own
property."

Representative Tom DeLay also joined saying,

"ownership of property is a right protected by the Constitution.
a precious right which should not be infringed upon except in the
most grave of circumstances.

Of course, such statements may be

more political rhetoric rather than well thought out reasons for
the proposed legislation.

Michael Wolf. in his book Overtaking

the Fifth Amendment asserts that such statement as the ones made'
by the Congressmen noted above. are framed to embrace
Constitutional values, the protection

of property rights. and

free enterprise, are "key rhetorical strategies employed by

-'.
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legislative champions of the property rights movement ... "

He

conclude that this "private property offecsive" has targeted the
Endangered Species Act, but that a more wide ranging attack on
regulation, ordinance, statutes and even principles of judicial
interpretation that shield the public at large from extant and
anticipatied harms.

Whether political rhetoric or heart-felt

beliefs, the statement still express the proponents' view of
their

position.

The statement may be a true reflection of why

proponents support the proposed legislation, and while Wolf and
others may doubt this, the courts when interpreting legislation
must presume that these statements represent the true intent of
the legislature.

Thus even a political realist must admit that

because these statements may effect how a law is later
interpreted they are of some importance.
UNDERLYING PHILOSOPHIES OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
The proponents' contention, that the proposals we have
discussed are consistent with the original intent behind the
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, depends on the assertion that
libertarian principles were the basis for this original intent.
The proposals' restriction on government regUlation or
interference with the right of land owners are based in the
libertarian principle of a limited government role and more
specifically Locke's idea of property as an inherent right which
deserves protection from intrusion.
book The

William M. Treanor is his

Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the

Political Process provides an in depth analysis of the ideology

...... _,-_ .. _
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and development of the Fifth Amendment.

Treanor contends that

"the takings clause was intended to apply only to physical
taking," and points to the Pennsylvania Coal decision as a
departure from the limitations of the Takings Clause as
originally understood.

Treanor then argues that liberalism was

not the dominant political ideology at the time of the framing,
but shared influence with republicanism.

He examines James

Madison's conception of the Takings Clause as support for the
arguments that the Takings Clause was intended to apply only to
physical takings and the argument that more than one ideology was
influential.

Treanor then proposes using the translation model

to develop a current analysis of takings consistent with
underlying principles.

He concludes that "compensation should be

mandated only in thise types of cases where the political process
is particularly unlikely to consider property claims fairly." (9)
These proposals also adopt very libertarian views from the
current case law, focusing on monetary value rather than the
balancing of interests which had been pursued through years of
Fifth Amendment interpretation of regulatory takings.

Such a

grouping of justifications seems to assume that the Fifth
Amendment rested solely on Locke's view of property rights and
role of government.

The assertion that the Takings Clause was

based solely on the Lockean view of property may previously have
been unchallenged, but it is certainly in dispute today.
Scholars dispute which theories were most influential during
the framing of the the Fifth Amendment. John F. Beggs. author of

----
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several books analyzing the Takings Clause, evaluates the
historical assumptions made by Justice Scalia and Justice
Blackmun in Lucas.

Beggs argues that oriinal intent behind that

Takings Clause was not influenced solely by the "classical
liberal model."

Beggs also argues that continuing reliance on

the framer's intent to resolve the regUlatory taking question is
misguided due to the evolution of the human condition. (9)

Some

commentators argue that the original intent behind the Fifth
Amendment was a liberal and expansive view of property rights in
the face of a potentially overbearing government.

Thus, the

definition of property as used in the Takings Clause willaffect
the extent to which the Takings Clause will limit legislative
action.

Thus, the definiton should bot promote intuitive

fairmess and observe the structural limitations on governmental
power without denying the existence of that power.

Accepting a

"nuisance based" definition of private property would limit the
legislative ability to redefine property right by manipulating
the distinction between harm and benefit.

This is in line with

the Founders' desire to protect the individual from overreaching
majoritarian decisions.

This particular argument rests on the

idea that the line between compensable actions and noncompensable
action should be drawn according to whether the government seeks
a public benefit from private property or prevention of a public
harm.

This view of limited Government intrusion with the rights

of property can be traced to the philodophy and writings of John
Locke.

Locke's political philosophy was of great influence at
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the time and his views were embraced by many involved in the
framing of the Constitution.

Locke espoused a theory of private

property rights which was novel for his time.

He believed that

the individual's right to property exists in nature and that
government should exist only to protect this and other inherent
rights of man.

Locke once said, "Political power is that power

Which every man having in the state of Nature has given up into
the hands of the society, and therein to the governors whom the
society hath set over it self, with this express or tacit trust,
that it shall be employed for their good and the preservation of
their property.

The counter view to Locke's view is presented by

James Harrington, who holds the republican view of property.
Harrington contends that only the distribution of land will
enable people to be involved in the political process. (10)
Therefore, land was not thought of a a political right but as a
political necessity.

Property was the means to facilitate

political balance and avoid

the oppression of the minorities by

the majority.
The equation of Lockean ideology with the political thought
behind the Takings Clause is incorrect.

While it would be wrong

to say that Locke has no influence on the founding generation, it
is equally incorrect to describe Lockean liberalism as the
ideology of the framing.

Thus, the belief that the expansion of

property rights protection is aligned with the originalist view
of the Fifth Amendment may be inaccurate.
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COMPARATIVE CASE LAW
There is, of course, no requirement that legislation follow
case law.

In rare instances, legislation has been enacted to

reject a specific decision with which Congress was unsatisfied,
as was the case with the Religious Freedoms Restoration Act.
However, the development of case law should at least inform
Congress of the balance of interests which exist.

Even if

Congress chooses to create more protection for a certain category
of rights, the work of the judiciary in dealing with the balance
of interests in a difficult area of law should not be cast aside
without consideration.
have done just that.

However, the authors of these proposals
As a result, the authors fail to consider

the current proposals have done just that.

As a result, the

authors fail to consider the public interst which has influenced
regulatory takings decisions in the past.
Now I will examine the early case law on takings, pointing
out that regulation was not considered significant enough by the
courts to warrant compensation under the Fifth Amendment until
the decision in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon in 1922.

The

development of regulatory takings law and the courts' struggle to
create a workable standard include the consideration of interests
on both sides of the issue.

While in the fifty years the cases

have become more protective of private property right under the
Fifth Amendment, they still have not rejected the need for
balance between private property rights and necessary regulations
which represent the public interest.

The authors of pro-property
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legislation have ignored this struggle.

The proposals embrace

the emergence of rules in the recent case law that reflect a more
restrictive standard for regulations which govern the use of
land.

the proponents have focused only on the portions of the

case law which support the most protective and thus most
libertarian ideas about property rights.

These ideas, which may

further protect property rights by making it easier to show total
diminution or no residual use, such as segmentation and partial
takings, have appeared in recent regulatory takings cases, such
as Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States.

While current

regulatory takings decisons may reject the balancing of interests
present in previous case law, this is true in only the most
extreme situations, as in Lucas.
Even if correct about the underpinning of the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause, the current pieces of legislation
proponent's fail to acknowledge the Takings Clause's evolution
through judicial interpretation.

Early case law decision provide

no basis for the adoption of the restricted role of government
with respect to the property rights.

Just the opposite is true.

The early case law did not find it necessary to compensate for
the impact of government regulation.

The early Supreme Court

interpretation of the Takings Clause extended property protection
only to physical takings or its close equivalent.

In the famous

case of Mungler v. Kansas the Court reasoned that regulation
adopted for the protection of the public interest did not
constitute a taking.

The regulation at issue in Mungler was a

.
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state prohibition on the manufavture and sale of alcohol. (12)
Two brewers challenged the regulation claiming that it
constituted an

unconstitutional taking because it rendered their

breweries valueless.

The Court held that the regulatory actions

of the government did not seriously impinge on the rights of the
property owners because the state was only limiting those actions
which were "prejudicial to the public interests."

"A prohibition

simply on the use of property for purposes that are declared, by
valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or
safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a
taking or an appropriation of property for the public benefit.
Several of the early takings cases are indistinguishable
from pUblic nuisance cases.

In both situations the government

was allowed to restrict the property owner's use without
compensation because the government was acting to protect the
public health and welfare.

In these cases, no one claimed that

the government would have to compensate the landowner.

T~e

Court

found the right of the government to restrict certain land uses
to be inherent in the property interest or a valid exercise of
the police power.

The Court's only inquiry concerned the

validity of the statute and this was undertaken with great
deference to the legislature.

The Court recognized that "the

discretion cannot be parted with any more than the power
itself." (12)
Now, the public nuisance doctrine and the right of the
government to exercise its police power fall into different legal

".,
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categories.

However, both the police power and public nuisance

doctrine are derived from the idea that property ownership and
use dictate the need for balancing the individual's right against
that of the community.

the balancing bacame more complicated as

the number of land uses expanded along with the number of
landowners.

Government, in adopting regulations that prohibit

certain land uses in certain areas, necessarily engages in a
balancing process, considering, among other things, which
activities are most socially useful.

However, the definiton of

social utility is an evolving notion.
Traditional case law analysis focused on monetary value, but
only in conjunction with other factors such as th character of
the governmental intrusion and the investment-backed
expectations.

In Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, the

Court found no set formula ikn determining what constitutes a
taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, but instead
finding that a number of significant factors must be considered
in each case; including the economic impact, investment-backed
expectations, and the character of the government intrusion. (13)
The first case to find that a government regulation violated the
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause was the 1922 case, Pennsylvania

Coal v. Mahon (14).

Pennsylvania Coal dealt with a state statute

prohibiting the mining of coal, despite ownership, that would
cause the subsidence of surface property owned by someone other
than the coal company.

The coal company challenged this law when

faced with an injunction obtained by a private surface property
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owner and claimed that the regulation resulted in a taking of
private property.

Since this land use regulation was authorized

by the state, the loss of this coal should be compensated, or the
statute held invalid.

Justice Holmes found that the economic

impact on the coal company imposed by this regulation was a
factor in finding that the government regulation in this case
violated the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, but was not
dispositive.

·One factor for consideration in determining such

limits is the extent of the diminution.

When it reaches a

certain magnitude, in most if not all cases there must be an
exercise of eminent domain and compensation to susain the act."
While this case seems to embrace the notion of private property
rights protection in the face of an overburdensome regulation,
other factors likely contributed to this outcome.
One other explanation for this decision is that the Court
believed that the state was interfering with private contract
rights.

The individual landowners who were losing their homes to

land subsidence had agreed to sell the support estates to the
coal mining companies.

Thus, the risk of subsidence was inherent

in the ownership of the surface property .and was probably
reflected in the prices paid by the surface owners versus that
paid by the coal companies.

The state regulation had gone "too

far" in this case not only because the state regulation
interfered with a private agreement.

This can be seen in the

case of Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania,

which the Court

distinguished in Pennsylvania Coal, in Plymouth Coal, the state
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passed a law mandating that a pillar of coal be left between
adjacent mines for the safety of the mine workers.

Here, the

Court found the law valid becase it was for the safety of the
mine workers and "secured an average reciprocity of advantage
that has been recognized as a justification of various laws." The
mine workers may not have bargained for this additional amount of
safety, but this imposition was acceptable given that the mining
company stood to benefit as well.

This implies that the thrust

of Justice Holmes concern may have been the level of government
intrusion into private contracts and not the percentage of
property at stake.
landowners.

This created a windfall for the surface

In short, the government was reallocating a property

interest to that handful of people who had knowingly sold their
rights in the first place.

"So far as private persons or

communities have seen fit to take the risk of acquiring only
surface rights, we cannot see that the fact that their risk has
become a danger warrants the giving to them greater rights than
they bought" Justice Holmes observed.

The argument that

Pennsylvania Coal is based, at least in part, on the fact that
the government regulation interfered with private contract rights
is also discussed in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.

DeBenedictis, decided sixty years after Penn Coal, dealt with a
similar government regulation restricting coal extraction that
caused subsidence.

The Court in Keystone (16) discussed the

distinction between the two statutes stressing that the more
recent statute was not limited to subsidence on private lands,
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but on public lands as well.
Despite the existence of private contract rights as a
contributing factor, Penn Coal still set a new precedent for
regulatory takings.

After this case, government regulation could

violate the Fifth Amendment.

But, a claer rule had not been

articulated and thus courts continued to struggle to find the
proper balance between private property rights and the public
interest.
The next significant case which made progress in stating a
rule for regulatory takings was Penn Central Transportaton Co. v.
New York City.

This case involved the right to build on top of

Grand Central Station in New York City.

Designated a "landmark

site," all plans to change the structure had to be approved by
the city.

After two building proposals were denied, the

station's owner, Penn Central, brought suit claiming these
denials constituted a regulatory taking under the Fifth
Amendment.

Rather than identify a particular level of diminution

in value or specific government actions which may be found overly
intrusive, the Court in Penn Central found, that because of
important interests on both sides, the consideration of various
factors was necessary.

The Court has recognized the the Fifth

Amendment guarantee is designed to bar government from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.

The Court

quite simply has been unable to develop any "set formula" for
determining when "justice and fairness" require that economic
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unjuries caused by public action be compensated by the
government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on
a few persons.

The Court articulated factors that "have

particular significance;" the economic impact of the regulation
on the claimant, the extent to which the regulation interferes
with investment backed expectations, and the character of the
governmetnal action.

In essence, the Court created a balancing

test requiring the examination of these articulated factors in
every case.
The balancing test articulated in Penn Central continues to
remain the focus of analysis in questions of regulatory takings,
except in situations that involve total diminution of all viable
economic use.

You can recognized this in Lucas v. South Carolina

Coastal Comm'n where someone whose land is diminished in value by
95% will not get the benefit of the categorical rule applied in
this case, but that finding that an application of the balancing
test articulated in Penn Central may result in finding a
compensable taking.

During the evolution of the regulatory

takings law, the Court found no absolute test, short of the total
diminution test articulated in Lucas, that would fairly evaluate
the interests of both private property owners and the public
interest in the regulation of land use.

Instead, the Court

consisitently found that the circumstances in each case must
determine the outcome.

In Lucas, the rule was established that a

regulation which prohibited all development, and therefore
decreases the value of the land to zero, went "too far" and
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compensation was required.

Lucas was a developer and bought two

beach front lots on which to build million dollar homes.

"Before

he sought a building permit, the South Carolina Coastal Council,
a state land planning agency, passed al law to preserve the
coastal lands.

The law moved the set-back line for development

to exclude Lucas's lots, prohibiting him from building the homes
he had intended and causing him the potential loss of the money
he had paid for the lots (6).
The South Carolina Supreme Court found no taking even though
the trial court record established that the value of the land had
been zeroed by the regulation.

The South Carolina Supreme Court

relied on the purpose underlying the Beach Front Management Act.
It was designed to "prevent serious public harm" by avoiding
erosion of the beach that may cause flooding and destruction of
the homes already in existence there.

The justification for the

Act was the history of problems that plagued the South carolina
coast in the past, threatening damage and destruction of homes.
The Supreme Court did not question the underlying purpose
for the Act or the justifications presented by the state.
Instead, the Court focused soley on the diminution in value in
Lucas's land.

The Court felt that in situations where the

landowner was deprived of all development possibilities, and
therefore all land value, the balancing test need not be
employed.

In such cases, the only important factor is the

"zeroinng out" of all property value.

It did not matter that

that the state sought to prevent "serious public harm."

The
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Court established a nuisance exception to this per se rule, but
in doing so refused to accept current legislative definitions
because any action can be justified as "harm preventing."
Instead, the regulating bod must now show that the use is
prohibited under existing state nuisance or common law.
The authors of the recent legislation we have mentioned have
failed to consider the difficulty which led the courts to reject
any absolute test.

Proponent ignore the factors articulated by

the courts in favor of only one consideration:
value.

diminution of

First, the legislators ignore the fact that the earliest

Fifth Amendment cases did not require compensation for mere
regulatory action.

This undermines any argument that the

proposals are needed to "restore" protection of property rights
since no significant protection from government regulation
existed prior to Pennsylvania Coal.

The lack of protection in

the early case law also tends to refute any claim that the
current case law is not in alignment with the original intent
behind the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.

If that were true,

the early case law would have reflected this intent, unless the
early interpretations were completely erroneous.
Secondly, the legislators ignore the judicial development of
the balancing test used in cases where the property has not been
rendered valuless.

The Lucas decision recognized that those

situations involving the depletion of all viable economic use
were the rare exception, thus implying that a consideration of
the balancing factors is unnecessary only in those situations
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where the regulatory effect is the most extreme.
insist that 50% devaluation is significant enough
total compensation.

Yet legislators
to warrant

This rule rejects even the most protetective

measures taken by the Supreme Court, one which recognized the
need for a less stringent rule in most regulatory takings cases.
The authors of the legislative proposals have not ignored
the case law altogether.

However, they used the current cases on

regulatory takings as a grab bag of ideas from which they select
only the ideas which support their notions of property rights.
Recent years have seen the emergence of new ideas in the case law
which represent the libertarian view espoused in the legislative
pieces.

First is the notion of segmentation.

Segmentation

shifts the focus in regulatory takings cases from the entire
property interest to only that portion or right affected by the
regulation.

Property rights advocates use this concept to claim

further devaluation than would exist if the denominator was
defined as the entire interest.

Second is the concept of

incomplete diminution, or "partial takings".

The effects are

similar to that of segmentation in that the less diminution
required, the more protection for property rights.

Both of these

concepts appear in the legislative proposals discussed above.
The Court in Penn Central rejected the use of segmentation
as a way to circumvent the interest balancing it had imposed,
finding that "taking jurisprudence does not divide a single
parcel into discrete segment and attempt to determine whether
rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated .•. "
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The plaintiff argued that the air space above Grand Central
Station constituted a separate right that was being taken, and
thus required government compensation.

If accepted, this

approach would have made it easier for courts to find regulatory
interference with property rights by focusing only on the use
which was lost.

The proposals would probably accept this

argument in favor of segmentation.

Both H.R. 925 and S. 605

would allow the landowner to assert a claim for compensation if
the affected portion of the property is diminished.

Since air

space may be considered a stick in the bundle of property rights,
it may constitute the affected portion of the property for
purposes of compensation under the rules state in the proposals.
The concept of segmentation was reasserted in Keystone v.
Debenedictis (15).

In this case, the Supreme Court evaluated a

Pennsylvania statute similar to the one found unconstitutional in
Penn Central.

Instead, the Court considered all the holdings of

the coal company in evaluating the effects of the statute on
their property interests, finding that only a relatively small
portion of the interest was a was effected by the mining
restriction.

The Court recognized that the segmentation argument

taken to its logical extreme would prohibit even the most minor
government regulation of property:

Under the petitioner's theory

one could always argue that a setback ordinance requiring that no
structure be built within a certian distance from the property
line constitutes a taking because the footage represents a
distinct segment of property for taking law purposes (72).
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Furthermore, the Court rejected the segmentation argument even in
light of Pennsylvania's recognition of a support estate as a
separate property interest, although Pennsylvania property law
does, or at least it did at that time, recognize the support
estate as a separate and therefore alienable property right, the
Court stated "that our takings jurisprudence forecloses reliance
on such legalistic distinctions within a bundle of property
rights.

The Court backed away from this assertion in finding,

with reliance on determinations made by the Court of Appeals,
that the support estate's value is merely a part of the entire
bundle of rights possessed by the owner of either the coal or the
surface.
Despite the Court's past refusals to consider segmentation
arguments, the issue is still unsettled.

In Lucas, Justice

Scalia wrote the opinion for the Court and addressed the issue of
segmentation in a footnote (6).

Scalia expressed disagreement

with how the Court's decision in Penn Central dealt with the
issue of segmentation.

Scalia stated that because the rule

concerning the correct "property interest" against which the loss
of value is to be measured is unresolved, it has created
inconsistencies in past decisons.

Scalia asserts that "the

answer to this difficult question may lie in how the owner's
reasonable expectation have been shaped by the state's law of
property."

Scalia did not attempt to square this opinion with

the Court's decision in Keystone.

However, the issue in Lucas

did not call for a resolution of this question.
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It seems that the dicta in Lucas found its mark in the
Federal Circuit Court's decision in Loveladies Harbor. (11)
Rather than focusing on the entire development project, the
litigation in Loveladies concerned only that 12.5 acres for which
a Corps of Engineers permit had been denied.

The Federal Circuit

Court referred to this as the "denominator problem," recognizing
that the outcome in many cases would differ depending on what
portion of the property is considered in the equation.

The Court

found that the decision about what portion of the property
constitutes the denominator in any given case should be informend
by the time at which the regulatory scheme was implememnted.

The

court in Loveladies found that the government had not attempted
to curtail development until after most of the development had
occurred.

Since there was no preexisting regulatory scheme, the

portion of the land which was already developed should be
excluded from consideration in applying the current regulatory
scheme.

Thus timing is a key factor in determining what portion

of a property interest constitutes the "denominator" in a
regulatory takings analysis.

Although it expands the

segmentation issue beyond prior case law, Loveladies also
potentially limits the application of segmentation to factually
similar situations where the regulatory scheme was not in place
at the time of the original purchase.
The second idea to emerge in the recent case law, is that of
"partial takings."

This notion holds that a partial diminution

in value may be sufficient for the court to find, without

~'-.
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consideration of other factors, that a government regulation
violates the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.

The partial takings

issue arose in Florida Rock Industries v. United States, another
Federal District Court decision. (17)

In Florida Rock, the

plaintiff challenged the denial of a wetlands mining permit
required under regulations imposed by the Corps of Engineers.
The claim was first asserted in the United States Court of
Federal Claims, which found that the permit denial constituted a
taking under the Fifth Amendment and awarded Florida Rock
$1,029,000.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit Court remanded the case with
instructions to focus on the "fair market value" of the property
after the permit denial and not just the use denied.

On remand

the Claims Court found the appraisal of Florida Rock, $500 per
acre, was the correct assessment of fair market value because
they reflected they reflected the buyer's knowledge of the
Current regulatory situtation.

Given Florida Rock's appraisals

the land was still not "valueless".

The Claims Court found the

95% reduction in value a sufficient enough to impact on Florida
Rock's property to find a taking when also

considering the

landowner's inablility to recoup its investment.
The government appealed again, and the Federal Circuit Court
instructed the Claims Court to take the government's appraisals
into account when determining the fair market value.

The Federal

Circuit Court then found that it would be necessary to determine
if partial diminution would be sufficient to find a taking, and

I,
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if so, how much diminution was necesarry.

The court noted,

nothing in the language of the Fifth Amendment compels a court to
find a taking only when the Government divests the total
ownership of the property; the Fifth Amendment prohibits the
uncompensated taking of private property without reference to the
owner's remaining property interests.
Addressing the "partial takings" issue, the Federal Circuit
Court found that Lucas implicitly suggested that a less than 100% .
diminution in value would not necessarily leave the landowner
uncompensated.

However, in Lucas the Court called for an

application of the traditional balancing test (stated in Penn
Central) in situations involving less than total diminution.
Despite this discussion in Lucas, the Federal Circuit Court
conclusion in Florida Rock was that at some point "mere
diminution" becomes "a compensable 'partial taking".
Both segmentation and partial takings are part of the
broader notion of "conceptual severance (18).

This notion

maintains that property, understood as the bundle of rights to
which the property owner is entitled, may be broken down into
individual fragments.

The extent of this deconstruction may be

dependent only upon the conceptual limitation of the ingenious
property lawyer.

The argument is that each fragment should enjoy

the protection of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, thus
immensely increasing the overall protection for private property
rights.

}"'!~

,

:7

32
THE NEED FOR BALANCE

No right is absolute.

Even rights to free speech are

qualified when it comes to the possibility of public harm.
Different kinds of speech are protected less than others.

OUr

notions of fairness to the individual, values about our society,
and community standards control the extent to which these rights
should be qualified.

It is always necessary to find a current

balance of interests, and property rights are no different.

The

debate about land use, government interests, and private property
rights is as polarizing today as the debate about the propriety
of seditious libel before the turn of the century.

While it is

easy to see the parallel between the Free Speech Clause and the
Takings Clause in that both have been controversial and require
the courts to consider important factors on all sides of the
debate, this is where the analogy has to end.

the factors which

inform each issue aare the same only to the extent that the
balance of interest often involve the projection of individual
rights in conjunction with the prevention of harm to the society.
The harms are values which must be considered differ greatly with
each issue.
The libertarian urge by the courts and the legislature to
sever property rights into discrete segments reflects an
individualistic, atomistic view of the world that is out of step
with life in the last decade of the twetieth century.

In an

increasingly crowded world this reactionary impolse to return to
a simpler time is understandable, but is inadequate for an era in
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which interdependencies become more apparent with each passing
day.
Recently enacted legislation in Florida demonstrates both
the need for and feasibility of compensation legislation that
seeks to maintain a balance of interests. (20)

The Bert J.

Harris, Jr. Private Property Rights Protection Act (or the
"Harris Act") is a compromise between environmentalists, the
property rights movement, and big business.

The Harris Act is

less clear cut and confers less extensive private property rights
than the federal legislative proposals that we discussed earlier.
The Act contains a compensation provison but does not attempt to
establish a quantitative value.

The Harris Act is much less

definite and leaves room for judicial interpretation, prompting
some to question whether the Act is really much of an advantage
over preexisting law. The Harris Act creates a cause of action
for landowners who feel that local government action has caused
an "inordinate burden" on individual property use.

Just what

constitutes an inordinate burden under the new Act is not clearly
defined and is left open for a judicial interpretation using a
balncing of the public and private interests involved.

The Act

does give general guidance, stating that an inordinate burden may
result when local action causes a permanent loss of reasonable
investment backed expectations of an existing use or vested
right.

No compensation is given for temporary interferences.

nuisance abatement, or inordinate burdens which result from
"transportation activities".
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As of the completion of this study, there have been no
reported decisions applying the Harris Act.

Several reasons may

explain this lack of judicial interpretation.

First, the Harris

Act only applies to applications of statutes, rules, and
ordinances enacted after May 11, 1995. Second, the Act only
applies to protect a "vested right" or "existing use" or real
property.

Lastly, the Harris Act has a provision requiring the

landowner to notify in writing the government entity that has
imposed the alleged burden 180 days prior to filing the suit.
The government may make a settlement offer during this period.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
With the wave of property rights protection legislation has
come some recognition by opponents that steps need to be taken to
remedy those frustrations which have been the impetus of such
harsh political reactions.

Private property rights have been

burdened by sometimes heavy-handed regulations.

The effect have

been detrimental not only for landowners, but also to the
advocates of land use planning and environmental protection.
does no good to polarize on an issue of such importance.

It

Steps

need to be taken to avoid alienating landowners to the point
where destruction rather than coperation becomes more
individually beneficial.

We must find solutions which make more

sense and whic would help allocate the burden of managed
restraint and thus maintain the necessary balance between private
property rights and the public interest.

Property rights,

economic liberties, and other vested rights to many political
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thinkers were around long before our government was founded.

As

SUCh, the doctrine or vested rights not only precluded
infringements, but also extended to damaging interference on
future economic benefits and contractual obigations as well.
Certainly, the government has compelling interests to balance
against those of individuals.

It is a dilemma that hasn't been

resolved over two centuries and a clear answer is not on the
horizon.

All due to one small clause in the Fifth Amendment,

the Takings Clause, which seems to be rather clear to the average
reader, but has power over the things we hold most dear in life.
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